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Abstract: Feminist philosophers of science have long discussed the important of taking situatedness into 
account in scientific practices in order to avoid erasing important aspects of lived experience. Through the 
example of Gillian Einstein’s situated neuroscience (2012), I will add support to Gallagher’s claims that 
intertheoretic reduction is problematic and provide reason to think pluralistic methodologies are 
explanatorily and ethically preferable.  
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Concerns about irreducibility and the relationships between gender, embodiment, and 
experience have been raised by feminist phenomenologists and philosophers of science in 
arguing that the objectification of nature in the hard sciences, as described by Gallagher (2019), 
is neither truly objective nor good scientific practice (see Harding 1991, Longino 1990). 
Feminist scientists and philosophers of science have also long discussed the importance of taking 
situatedness into account in order to ‘reveal or prevent the disappearing of the experience and 
activities of women and/or to prevent the disappearing of gender’ (Longino 1994: 50). Recent 
work in neurofeminism demonstrates the ongoing problems encountered in scientific 
explanations that attempt to cash out gender differences in terms of sexed brains or functions 
(Fine 2011). Considerations such as these add a compelling ethical dimension to Gallagher’s 
(2019) invitation to re-envision the concept of nature as specified by what he calls ‘science in its 
classic form.’  
While Gallagher’s concern stems from commitments to a non-reductionist 
phenomenological program, the call for a non-reductionist approach to cognitive science could 
benefit from attention to the innovative research being done by feminist scientists, such as 
Gillian Einstein (2012) and Anne Fausto-Sterling (2016), through the use of pluralistic 
methodologies. Using Einstein’s situated neuroscience as an example, my commentary will lend 
support to two lines of thought in Gallagher’s paper: that there are irreducible aspects of lived 
experience through which our relations with the world take on significance particular to subjects 
(both practitioner and subject of study), and that taking these aspects into account can lead us to 
develop more fruitful scientific practices.  
So as to avoid any ambiguities, it is important to clarify in what sense it is that 
irreducibility is being used. While Gallagher states that he is focused on issues with Nagelian, or 
intertheoretic reduction, McGivern (2019) points out that there are other senses of reduction that 
could also be important in calling for a non-classical conception of nature, such as reductions to 
causal mechanisms and functional roles. Gallagher seems unlikely to object to this, as his point is 
not to claim that subjectivity is only intertheoretically irreducible (or that any kinds of 
irreducibility are mutually exclusive). Gallagher’s main target, though, is not reductionism, but a 
scientific naturalism that demands reductionist methods and explanations. While subjectivity 
may be irreducible on his account, this only serves to scaffold his argument that subjectivity 
ought to be centralized in our re-conception of nature, naturalism, and science.  
Rather than focus on the irreducibility of subjectivity in general, I will be concerned with 
the importance of the incorporation of subjectivity in scientific methodologies and practices. I 
will use as an example Gillian Einstein’s (2012) triangulation of methods (first-person, third-
person, and physiological) in studying the effects of female genital cutting (FGC) on the central 
nervous system of a specifically situated sociocultural group (Somali-Canadians). Einstein’s 
approach, dubbed situated neuroscience, demonstrates how attending to data gained through 
multiple methods helps in better understanding the data from each, and that the reciprocities 
between the domains of study, as well as among subjects and scientists themselves, should be 
part of a complete scientific explanation. Her study design thus takes into consideration the 
situation of the scientist, as part of the study herself, and the lived experiences and sociocultural 
situation of the subject(s).  
In this particular project, Einstein (ibid.: 150) sought to better understand the effects of 
the traditional cultural practice of FGC, which, as she describes,  
in its most extreme examples requires excision of the clitoris (Clitoridectomy), cutting off 
the labia minora (Excision], cutting the labia majora (Excision), and suturing the labia 
majora together to make a small hole from which urine and menstrual blood can flow 
(Infibulation). 
She hypothesized that the procedure caused lasting bodily effects, which, in turn, led to 
differences in the way that recipients experienced the world, in a way that could not be explained 
simply by looking at the central nervous system itself—the effects instantiated a lived, corporeal 
embodiment of their culture.  
In the design stage, Einstein consulted with midwives and others in community 
healthcare to ensure the study was attending to the kinds of issues and features of experience 
important or meaningful to the involved group. Determining how best to collect first-person data 
involved looking at ways that using certain types of collection methods would encourage or 
hinder participants and the kinds of concepts considered appropriate or inappropriate to describe 
their experiences. As Einstein (2012: 154) says, ‘the semi-structured version [of the interview] 
did not allow women to tell their stories in a way that did justice to the stories themselves’, so 
she chose to do away with questionnaires or shorter interviews to allow for a more narrative 
approach to gathering first-person qualitative data. As Einstein (ibid.:154) describes, ‘Because 
pain is so culturally dependent, it became apparent that it was important to give the body a voice 
as well and to explore how different narratives about pain aligned’. Because the sociocultural 
meaning of the practice was taken seriously as influential in establishing and describing the 
effects on the embodied experience of the recipients, narratives provided a richer and deeper 
understanding of the impact of the procedure. 
The third-person component involved a measuring of the subjects’ pain threshold at four 
vulvular regions, or ‘quantitative sensory testing’, in a laboratory setting to determine how the 
pain appeared on a scale that could be compared to the pain thresholds of differently situated 
patients. The physiological component incorporated findings from the day-to-day lives of the 
study participants, including reports of their experiences during and before menses, difficulties 
lifting their children or walking during some times of the month, and so on. This data was then 
compared with reports given by Somali women in Diaspora, Finland, about pains particular to 
their population (Tiilikainen 2001).  
Though it involved a third-person component, Einstein’s (2012) methodology was 
certainly not reductive, but rather attended to the situatedness of both scientist and subjects 
through thoughtful and deliberate measures. Her situated neuroscience is a paradigm example of 
how the impact of feminist critiques of objectification has led to richer scientific practices. First, 
Einstein (ibid.: 168) says,  
[I] tried to redress a wrong born of a Cartesian vision of the body comprised of separable 
parts. I questioned whether the Cartesian model of the separation of body and mind, which 
undergirds modern biomedicine, is in fact an adequate place to start in describing the 
biologies of women. 
Recall that Gallagher (2019: XXX), similarly, states that ‘a reductionist program is possible only 
on an understanding of nature as a partes-extra-partes objective totality, which, along with 
Merleau-Ponty, we should reject.’ While Einstein’s (2012) study purports to focus on the 
‘brains’ of participants rather than reducing the effects of FGC to subjects’ bodies, it did 
incorporate some aspects amenable to more enactive and embodied approaches to cognitive 
science. The interplay between personal narratives, social meaning, and the lived body was taken 
seriously throughout. For example, it was important to note that women who had the procedure 
felt that it made them more beautiful, more desirable, and that it gave them more social capital, 
which is important when looking at how the procedure effects how one carries herself and 
interacts within a social environment. Through an enactivist lens, one could use the data gleaned 
from the study to discuss the way that embodying culture makes more salient certain 
environmental and social affordances (Chemero 2009, Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014). As 
Gallagher (2018: XXX) explains it,  
the function of an object is never just purely the function of an object-in-general; what 
matters are the affordances that an object offers to a particular agent. Accordingly, the object 
is never neutral, and . . . behaviour simply cannot be reduced to differences in brain function 
alone, ignoring the details of body and world. 
Second, Einstein’s (2012) study involved a mindful situating of herself as researcher,  
thereby recovering for scrutiny in the results of research the entire research process. That is, 
the class, race, culture and gender assumptions, beliefs and behaviors of the researcher 
her/himself must be placed within the frame of the picture that she/he paints (Harding 1987: 
29, cited in Einstein 2012: 168).  
Stemming from a rejection of a fact/value distinction, situating oneself brings to the forefront of 
a study the sociocultural influences on the types of valuations the scientist brings into data 
collection and interpretation. Another insight from feminist theory that can be seen in Einstein’s 
study is the importance of viewing knowledge production processes as a collective, not 
individual, endeavour.  
Third, Einstein (ibid.) makes it clear that none of the approaches used in the study, nor 
the information collected through a particular approach, should be treated as more valuable than 
another. It was imperative that ‘one field (i.e., social science) is not subordinated or used in the 
service of the other (i.e., biological science) and especially, that one isn’t privileged over the 
other’ (ibid.: 157). This seems very much aligned with Gallagher’s (2018: XXX) suggestion that 
rethinking the scientific conception of nature would involve ‘a multidisciplinary approach that 
necessarily discounts every single discipline for the sake of the many; where neither 
neuroscience, nor psychology, nor phenomenology … gets the final say’.  
Many feminist philosophers and scientists have been at ease with the kind of 
methodological naturalism that eschews a priori principles of objectification, hierarchical 
organization, and reductive explanations. As Einstein (2012: 147) says on the implications of her 
own approach, ‘a new philosophy of science might allow each field and subfield to have their 
say, move in their own directions and dictate their own theory.’ Her methodology seems to 
firmly reject any kind of theoretical hierarchy. The success of Einstein’s methodology adds 
support to Gallagher’s (2018: XXX) claim that ‘to reduce the embodied agent to a set of 
computational-neuronal processes that can be analyzed in terms of physical reality or nature, 
[scientists] not only miss something important, they frame their explanations in the wrong way.’ 
To reject a priori the role that the body, sociocultural situation, and personal history play for 
understanding how gender and sex specific practices and norms shape experience would be to 
foreclose on a rich research avenue offering nuanced, multidimensional explanations. This 
becomes an ethical and political issue when we consider that the experiences and values of 
marginalized groups are often disregarded or treated as anomalous. To simply study or reduce 
explanations to neural mechanisms and biophysical structures thus doesn’t just risk leaving out 
important details, but often fails to consider who decides which phenomena are important and 
how. Through the example of Einstein’s practice of situated neuroscience, I hope to have shown 
that there are viable scientific methodologies that can incorporate enactive, embodied approaches 
with other scientific practices and critical theories in offering a feasible way forward in 
redefining how we approach scientific practices, phenomena of interest, and perhaps nature 
itself.  
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